Difficult to know how gains from subsidies were distributed between shareholders and mortgage-holders pre-crisis given implicit risks.
|Alberto Alesina||Harvard||Agree||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Joseph Altonji||Yale||Uncertain||1||Bio/Vote History|
|Alan Auerbach||Berkeley||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|David Autor||MIT||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Katherine Baicker||Harvard||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Marianne Bertrand||Chicago||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Raj Chetty||Stanford||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
Lower rates were also a likely outcome.
|Janet Currie||Princeton||Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|David Cutler||Harvard||Uncertain||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Angus Deaton||Princeton||Uncertain||1||Bio/Vote History|
Hard to be certain. F and F used cheap funding to massively expand mortgage financing, so may also caused a large impact on mortgage rates.
|Aaron Edlin||Berkeley||Did not answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Barry Eichengreen||Berkeley||Uncertain||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Ray Fair||Yale||Uncertain||5||Bio/Vote History|
While shareholders certainly benefited, borrowers faced lower interest rates too.
|Claudia Goldin||Harvard||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
research shows only small % went to borrowers. But not all went to shareholders--can't forget the rent-seeking or the emp. compensation
there is evidence of a small impact on interest rates on loans. i suspect that shareholders AND managers captured some of the rents.
According to a leading expert, the estimates of the pass-through to borrowers vary between 1/3 and 2/3.
The fact that investment firms held onto some loans, competing with Fannie and Freddie, suggests consumers didn't capture all of subsidy.
|Caroline Hoxby||Stanford||Did not answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Kenneth Judd||Stanford||Disagree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|Anil Kashyap||Chicago||Strongly Agree||9||
Well documented by Greenspan in 2004! Sadly the F & F losses was one part of the crisis that was foreseen and Congress refused to act.
-see background information here
At least judging from mortgage rates in the U.S. vs. other OECD countries without GSEs.
-see background information here
Private issuers could have achieved the same effect absent F/F's govt granted advantage. Shareholders' benefits were arbitraged away, though
|Jonathan Levin||Stanford||Did not answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Eric Maskin||Harvard||No Opinion||
I don't know enough about this issue to express a public opinion.
|William Nordhaus||Yale||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Maurice Obstfeld||Berkeley||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Emmanuel Saez||Berkeley||Agree||3||Bio/Vote History|
|José Scheinkman||Princeton||Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|Richard Schmalensee||MIT||Agree||3||Bio/Vote History|
|Hyun Song Shin||Princeton||Uncertain||8||Bio/Vote History|
|James Stock||Harvard||Did not answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Nancy Stokey||Chicago||Agree||4||Bio/Vote History|
|Richard Thaler||Chicago||No Opinion||
Sounds reasonable but I don't know enough to have a real opinion.
|Christopher Udry||Yale||Uncertain||1||Bio/Vote History|
|Luigi Zingales||Chicago||Did not answer||Bio/Vote History|
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