Question A:
A common European deposit insurance scheme, once fully implemented, would increase the stability of European economies in the event of another financial crisis.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
A common European deposit insurance scheme, once fully implemented, would increase the likelihood of another financial crisis in Europe.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Theoretically it can go both ways as deposit insurance can increase risk taking. Empirically there is some evidence crises can increase.
-see background information here |
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Though not the most valuable form of cross-border risk-sharing
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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“Fully implemented” implies implementation in a way that minimizes moral hazard, e.g. through a European reinsurance scheme.
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 Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A common system appears constraining, given differences in financial systems across countries.
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In principle effect of DI in crisis is clear, but for EU DI much depends on implementation and harmonization. EU has mixed record on that.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Peter Neary |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Actually, creating a euro-wide deposit insurance system is a necessary element to complete the Banking Union and stabilise Europe's banks.
-see background information here |
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A common scheme prevents a race to the bottom in the event of a crisis, and should include a fair contributn system across countries exante
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But other measures matter more -- e.g. depositor preference for insured deposits. Then, if(??) resolution works, deposits are safe anyway.
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 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A common deposit insurance scheme will somewhat weaken the bank runs that occur in euro area countries with fiscal or banking problems.
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 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Helps break the doom loop
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 Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Complicated issue because of the effect of deposit insurance on risk taking.
-see background information here |
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Timothy J. Besley |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Empirical evidence on emerging countries seems to indicate this. Could we extrapolate to Europe? Not obvious
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not with adequate supervision and macroprudential policies
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Francesco Giavazzi |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Removing bank default risk from small depositors would not imply a dangerous subsidy of risk-taking by supervised banks
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Henrik Kleven |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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No, it would not iprovided it is implemented cleverly, e.g. relying on a reinsurance scheme.
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Per Krusell |
Stockholm University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Moral hazard is relevant but so is a risk of runs. I’m not an expert.
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Clear tradeoff w/ ex ante moral hazard. Evidence supports this & some suggests ex ante effect dominates but much depends on supervision.
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Neary |
Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Kevin O'Rourke |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Quite the opposite: it is essential for systemic stability of the banking system. Of course, if it is well designed!
-see background information here |
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Uncertain because could distract from more fundamental issues such as the need for European banks to have much more capital
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Beatrice Weder di Mauro |
The Graduate Institute, Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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While there is possibly an element of moral hazard with deposit insurance, crisis are generally due to inadequate banking regulation.
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Regulation and supervision needs to be strong
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Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Yale University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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