Question A:
Changing federal income tax rates, or the income bases to which those rates apply, can affect federal tax revenues partly by altering people’s behavior, and thus their actual or reported incomes.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
To the extent that a given tax change might affect revenues partly by affecting national-income growth, existing research provides enough guidance to generate informative bounds on the size of any growth-driven revenue effect.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
For large proposed changes in tax rates or the tax base, official revenue forecasts provided to Congress would probably be more accurate if the CBO and JCT tried to estimate fully how the proposed tax changes would affect growth-driven revenue.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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More is know about static effects on labor supply, labor demand and investment than on productivity growth, which is key to long term growth
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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We're still debating the impact of TFRA 86 on economic growth. Clearly, our confidence intervals are infinite for these predictions.
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The bounds might be wide, though.
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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"Enough" is the issue. We have models which provide estimates. There is a large cloud of uncertainty around these estimates.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Dynamic scoring: A back-of-the-envelope guide,
N. Gregory Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl, J. Pub. Econ. 2006
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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go read it. it does no such thing
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Taxes affect level of economic activity in long run But evidence doesn't exist for meaningful revenue predictions esp in near or medium term
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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A lot depends on the response of monetary policy, and there is no agreement on how much policy should or does respond to output changes.
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I doubt that we know enough. There are disagreements about the response of labor supply to moderate changes in income tax rates.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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That work does not try to model the true economy. E.g., no model of corp inc tax uses a valid price of risk. Economists prefer ignorance.
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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don't think we know for many types of changes
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maybe in some cases. Seems like a hard problem in general.
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's always difficult to turn qualitative predictions into precise estimates, but existing research can surely be helpful.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The bounds likely rule out some outcomes but may be very wide
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In most cases we know very little. Chetty et al Danish study finds tax effects explain 1% of saving, design 99%.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I worry about increased scope for political influences on the forecasts.
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I feel that this type of projection is unwise: first-order impacts on policy but almost zero reliability. And it invites gaming.
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In theory they could provide many estimates under different scenarios. But picking one number or a likely range would introduce politics.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I thought they had already done this at CBO. If not, the research indicates they should give it a try. The stakes are relatively large.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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it would open the process up to political shenanigans of the worst kind
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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poor state of literature would open the door to "judgment" which seems likely to devolve to political wrangling and lots of uncertainty
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Again, the response of other elements of policy, monetary and fiscal, needs to be factored in, and there is great uncertainty.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The estimates would not be perfect but they would be better than assuming no response.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's wrong of them not to TRY because then they are knowingly getting things wrong. However, they could easily make a mess of it.
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It certainly would not be worse. Unfortunately, this is the kind of research that NSF kills.
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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We know the direction and for certain types of changes might have some decent estimates. But politics could corrupt the process too
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Possibly. They might also be less transparent and/or easy to criticize.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The difficulties are that (a) knowledge of these has wide bounds and (b) communicating uncertainty bounds is virtually impossible.
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Behavioral responses will be most important for large changes, but the effects of large changes are particularly difficult to estimate.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It depends on which estimates they used.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If done honestly, maybe, but the temptation to tilt would be strong. It is the rare tax cut that increases tax revenues.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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