Factors Contributing to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis

October 17th, 2017

Please rate the importance (0=none; 5= highest) of each item below (presented to panelists in randomized order) in contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis.

© 2017. Initiative on Global Markets.
Source: IGM Economic Experts Panels
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

© 2017. Initiative on Global Markets.
Source: IGM Economic Experts Panels
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

The following items were presented to panelists in randomized order.

  1. Inadequate or flawed regulation, supervision, or both with respect to the financial sector (which includes financial infrastructure, banks, shadow banks, and interconnections in the system)
  2. Underestimation of the riskiness of securities created with financial engineering
  3. Bad incentives, fraud, or both in mortgage issuance and securitization
  4. Funding runs involving short-term liabilities financing long-term assets
  5. Failures by rating agencies
  6. Inflated beliefs about housing prices
  7. Elevated levels of US household debt as of 2007
  8. A belief by bankers that their institutions were Too Big to Fail
  9. Government involvement in subsidizing mortgages, homeownership, or both
  10. Imbalances between global savings and well-functioning channels for investing those savings
  11. Loose monetary policy by the Fed, by central banks around the world, or both
  12. Fair value or mark-to-market accounting for financial assets held by banks

Below are the individual responses for the US Panel.
Click here for the individual responses for the European Panel.

Participant University Vote Confidence Comment
Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 5
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
6 Bio/Vote History
Alesina
Alberto Alesina
Harvard
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
1
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2
E. Rating Agency Failures 1
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 3
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
3 It is a bit of everything not easy to put weights on every single factor

Bio/Vote History

Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
3
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion0
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
4 Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
5 Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 5
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
6

Bio/Vote History

Baicker
Katherine Baicker
Chicago
   Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 3
4 Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
6 Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 4
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
9 In addition, there were some global factors which made the crisis spread to Europe and the rest of the world.

Bio/Vote History

Chetty
Raj Chetty
Stanford
   Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
3
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3
G. Household Debt Levels No Opinion
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
3 Assessing the relative contribution of intertwined factors hard to do with high confidence.

Bio/Vote History

Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
3 Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 1
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 1
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
6 I have marked down importance if item seems to be more of consequence than a cause.

Bio/Vote History

Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 3
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
10 Causes and responsibilities are related but not the same. Regulators bear significant responsibility for weak oversight. Systemic risk is an externality that calls for supervision. The most proximate causes were runs on short term debt (D. Diamond).

Bio/Vote History

Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 0
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 4
L. Fair-Value Accounting 4
6 Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 2
5 Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 4
5 Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 2
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 0
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 0
5 Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 3
3 Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
   Did Not Answer
5 Bio/Vote History
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 2
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
8 Some of those were symptoms rather than causes but it’s a pretty comprehensive list.

Bio/Vote History

Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 2
6 Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 1
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
1
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 2
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1
G. Household Debt Levels 1
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 4
1 The government’s policies of bailing out financial institutions created a fragile financial system. Financial collapse resulted in a major loss of confidence.

Bio/Vote History

Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 5
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 4
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
8 People believed that aggregate house prices would always rise. Subprime mortgages / looked attractive even though they weren’t. There was fraud but also overconfidence. When many key firms fail at the same time politics forces the government to act.

Bio/Vote History

Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) No Opinion
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
1
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2
G. Household Debt Levels 5
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 4
6 Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
   Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs No Opinion
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy No Opinion
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
6 Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
6 Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 3
L. Fair-Value Accounting 0
6 Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
2
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
9 i teach a class on financial crises with a big focus on the last crisis. the votes reflect the time spent in class on the various features. the squam lake report still reads well as a description of problems and suggestions about what to do.
-see background information here

Bio/Vote History

Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
3
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
5 -see background information here
-see background information here

Bio/Vote History

Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
3
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4
K. Loose Monetary Policy 3
L. Fair-Value Accounting 2
1 Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 2
7 -see background information here

Bio/Vote History

Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
2
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 0
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
8 Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 3
5 Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 1
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 4
5

Bio/Vote History

Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Princeton
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
2
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3
G. Household Debt Levels 2
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 0
8 Inflated housing prices would have collapsed, but with much less severe global consequences if financial institutions had not chosen to hold as much housing risk (due to greed or stupidity) or if regulators and rating agents had done their jobs.

Bio/Vote History

Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2
E. Rating Agency Failures 2
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 1
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 0
3 Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
4
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 4
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 2
L. Fair-Value Accounting 1
6 Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 2
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
1
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5
E. Rating Agency Failures 3
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 3
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1
K. Loose Monetary Policy 1
L. Fair-Value Accounting 3
2

Bio/Vote History

Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago
A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4
B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4
C. Mortgages: Fraud and
Bad Incentives
5
D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3
E. Rating Agency Failures 5
F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4
G. Household Debt Levels 4
H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2
I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3
J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion
K. Loose Monetary Policy 3
L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion
3 No one cause. Lots of blame to attribute.

Bio/Vote History

Udry
Christopher Udry
Yale
   Did Not Answer
7 Bio/Vote History

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