Question A:
Enactment of the Senate bill to subject the Federal Reserve's monetary policy and discount window decisions to an audit by the Comptroller General of the U.S. would improve the Fed's legitimacy without hurting its decision making.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The Fed should not reduce its purchases of mortgage-backed securities and treasurys until there is clearer evidence of strong and sustained employment growth.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The bill will reduce the policy independence of the Fed.
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It is important for the Fed to be able to operate with a minimum of political interference.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This depends on whether the audit is used to reduce the discretion of the Fed when acting within its mandate. I would need some specifics.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Um, have you seen how it has worked in countries with political oversight of monetary policy decisions?
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The existing system of an independent Fed acting with finality has worked well. There's nothing to be gained from such an audit.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This looks like an attempt at facilitating more political interference with Fed policy.
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The point of this bill is to dial back central independence. Abundant evidence suggests worse monetary policy will follow if it is enacted.
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This could work in principle, but generally more Central Bank independence has led to better decisions.
-see background information here |
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Don't know enough about the bill to have a particularly strong view.
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hard to see any effect on its legitimacy or effectiveness.
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Central bank independence is important.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It seems like a dangerous reduction in fed autonomy.
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Quantitative easing has had to substitute for fiscal stimulus in this recovery, so it should not be ended while it is still needed.
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judging when the marginal cost of "exit" risks exceeds the marginal stimulative benefits is difficult with only the data available to me.
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The economy isn't strong yet.
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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5 years of growth at 2%, unemployment around or above 7.5% and core inflation well below the target says DO NOT TIGHTEN.
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Risk w Fed's strategy but we are far below potential output Effect on int rates of tapering culd be large, see May-June int rate increase
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The Fed has responsibility for controlling inflation. Though quite unlikely, the Fed might need to contract if inflation surged.
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Benefits of more QE now seems small. QE won't cause inflation, but the forward guidance cum QE is creating some financial stability risk.
-see background information here |
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But I am worried about it may be coming at the cost of misallocation.
-see background information here |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Caveat: how big an effect these purchases are actually having on employment is not that clear to me.
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I interpret this as saying that should continue until are on trajectory that would lead to high employment in 2-3 years.
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The question is somewhat vague: clearer than what? Consistency in policy is important, so continuing is probably useful.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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