Question A:
Removing intellectual property protections on Covid-19 vaccines would substantially improve availability of the vaccines in developing countries.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Removing intellectual property protections on Covid-19 vaccines would have a negative impact on vaccine development efforts for future variants of SARS-CoV-2 or for the next pandemic.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
Without an international agreement that facilitates vaccine trade, countries’ incentives to limit exports of vaccines and/or key production inputs are likely to prolong the adverse effects of the pandemic in advanced countries.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Relaxing ex post monopoly after invention helps users, esp. poor users. Sometimes IPR important for market entry but not likely in this case
|
||||
 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
With 10-12 vaccines, many w/strong commitments to license to anyone, other supply chain issues seem to be a stronger impediment.
|
||||
 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
But this does NOT mean that it is good policy, especially without qualifications.
|
||||
 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
My "agree" does not imply that I think this is a good idea. But if the cost of an already developed product is cut, take-up will increase.
|
||||
 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Sharing know-how is also important.
|
||||
 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It is politics, not IPR: extremely stringent criteria for borrowing for vaccines designed to exclude Russian, India and Chinese vaccines
|
||||
 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Outside my area of expertise. I believe vaccines are currently sold to those countries at below full market prices.
|
||||
 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
There is a large expert literature on this topic.I am not one of the experts so I would ask a few of them rather than give an amateur answer
|
||||
 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Given the need for herd immunity globally, I suspect that vaccines will be available worldwide without this change.
|
||||
 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Firms need IP to recover R&D costs but the high prices should be applied only to sales in developed countries with others paying at most MC.
|
||||
 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
see all the other roadblocks listed in question c, not clear whether this alone would move the dial
|
||||
 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Perhaps, but not sure it works better than subsidizing purchases or investments in capacity.
|
||||
 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Removing all or for low-income markets? Yes for latter.
|
||||
 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Vaccines are notoriously complex to manufacture and regulate, as evidence
from the COVID-19 pandemic has made clear. See ch 3 in PDF below.
-see background information here |
||||
 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
There may be effective interventions less drastic than simply removing protection, but some intervention would enhance availability.
|
||||
 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Initial increase may not be substantial given the many licensing agreements already in existence.
|
||||
 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I don't know if shortages of know-how, production facilities, or critical inputs would prevent expansion of production.
|
||||
 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Not sure about "substantially" because the drug companies will (eventually) permit generics for the rest of the world.
|
||||
 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Not sure about "substantially", especially in relevant time frame. Need more than this, because even marginal cost pricing is too high.
|
||||
Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Drug innovation respond to profits (see links). But there is plenty of profits from rich nations; those from LDCs won't to be decisive.
-see background information here |
||||
|
Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
New equilibrium: If governments lift vaccineIP protections ex post, they should be prepared to pay for the next round of vaccines ex ante.
|
||||
|
Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The answer depends on how this is done. It could be a relatively cheap buy out--the developers have made enough money already from the OECD.
|
||||
|
Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Details matter but a change in the rules that makes it harder for companies to recoup investments in variant development, etc. problematic
|
||||
|
David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Depends if in all countries or just low income countries.
|
||||
|
Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Negative indicates sign, no more. And again, everything is in how it is done.
|
||||
|
Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Compensation could limit or eliminate any negative impact.
|
||||
|
Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Without any compensation for taking it away you mean?
|
||||
|
Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Some economists have proposed to avoid this issue through government buyouts of IP rights.
|
||||
|
Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Removing IP protection is not a method of internalizing externalities that comes out of economics (public goods) theory.We have smarter ways
|
||||
|
Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Look at Pfizer's share price since the start of the pandemic, even with success and current regime it has not gained that much
|
||||
|
Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Same point as above.
|
||||
|
Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This vaccine received massive government support, and such support could ensure future development despite protection compromises.
|
||||
|
José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Unless governments can coordinate and institute appropriate prizes, which in the case of vaccines are probably superior to IP protection.
-see background information here |
||||
|
Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Depends. Lucrative contracts to supply vaccines to rich countries with no impediments to sales in other countries could work very well.
|
||||
|
Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It all depends on when you do it. I am all for setting up prizes for vaccine and other drugs. We have to let them make some money.
|
||||
|
Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Incentivizing pandemic-context vaccine development via expected monopoly profits from patent protection is insane. Public investment needed.
-see background information here -see background information here |
||||
Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Global cooperation is key for a global pandemic. If half of the world does not vaccinate, new mutants will emerge and spread in the West too
-see background information here |
||||
|
Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Low certainty here as details matter.
|
||||
|
David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Lots of ways of writing such an agreement, and not doing so is hardly a real possibility.
|
||||
|
Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Uncertain now how big a problem this is. Potentially big.
|
||||
|
Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It's too late for int. agreem. and it would not be enforceable anyway. By end of 2021 there will be enough production capacity for everyone
|
||||
|
Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
This question seems to presuppose that individual countries have market power in the world market for vaccines, which is not obvious
|
||||
|
Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Question is just too vague for me to answer. Details of trade agreements matter.
|
||||
|
Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Risk aversion and own country preference would seem a big obstical.
|
||||
|
Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Increasing returns to scale imply that coordination and cooperation can be far more effective than individual national programs.
|
||||
|
Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
far from my expertise, but this seems like an own goal. if the virus is alive in developing countries how does normality elsewhere prevail?
|
||||
|
Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
See ch 10 by Bown and Bollyky in the Peterson Institute Briefing issued today, URL below. We need an international vaccine treaty.
-see background information here |
||||
|
Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Advanced countries are safe from the virus only when the entire world is safe.
|
||||
|
José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
