Question A:
Research on the nature and impact of bank runs has made it possible to limit the occurrence of financial crises and the economic damage they cause.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Despite repeated reforms of financial regulation (and macroprudential policies in some countries), there will always be occasional financial crises.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I think the research on financial crises has helped us understand them better and has lead to better policies.
|
||||
 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Better prudential and macroprudential regulation
|
||||
 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Well, maybe it has helped a little, but complex and opaque investment strategies and financial instruments mean that the practical usefulness of the sunspot bank run models is limited. Explaining each new crisis seems to require new models, usually developed only ex post.
|
||||
 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Fundamental research such as Diamond/Dybvig's has trained the thinking of the entire profession, and in that sense it has contributed to a post-crisis regulation such as the BRRD in Europe, emphasizing equity and bail-in debt to establish market discipline, and to fight runs..
|
||||
 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Some of the policy lessons include the importance of deposit insurance and the lender of last resort, not only for banks but also for other fragile financial institutions.
|
||||
 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Better understanding and use of LoLR and MMoLR. Greater resilience in banking sector. But still major weaknesses in derivatives exposures and hidden leverage in non-bank financial intermediation.
|
||||
 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The Diamond-Dybvig framework has increased our understanding of bank runs long before the global financial crisis. Also, what can be done to lower risk of runs (e.g., sufficient reserves) is well known.
|
||||
 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Yes but whether policy since 2008 has gone far enough to limit the occurrence and consequences of crises is another matter
|
||||
 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Many key regulations - such as capital requirements or leverage limits - are derived from the theoretical and empirical literature on bank runs.
|
||||
Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
It's very difficult to understand all the possible ways in which crises can occur. The Liability-Driven Investment strategies are an example. It seems few people realised the potential for systemic risk.
|
||||
|
Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Risks have moved away from regulated banks + macroprudential policy is more about limiting the impact of crises than about limiting crises themselves.
|
||||
|
Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Bubbles and credit booms will continue to fuel the appetite for risk of economic agents
|
||||
|
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Financial crises don't repeat themselves - because there is learning on the side of both, regulators and investors. But there are also --always-- unknown interdependencies in markets and between institutions, unexpectedly coming to light, and potentially triggering a crisis.
|
||||
|
Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Foolproof financial regulation is likely not feasible and/or too costly (i.e., more costly than the crises it prevents).
|
||||
|
Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Redesigning the financial system to eliminate future crises would likely be too costly for society in the long run.
|
||||
|
Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Finance - indeed capitalism - is about taking risks. Some will go bad. Sometimes those failures will be correlated and contagious. Good regulation can increase resilience but can’t avert all crises.
|
||||
|
Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
We can prevent some run-ups, reduce the collapses, and boost the recoveries, but the state of our knowledge is quite far from eliminating them entirely.
-see background information here |
||||
|
Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
lobbying efforts by banks (and short memories of voters) mean policymakers will tend to unwind the necessary regulation
|
||||
|
Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
One can at most curb the risk of bank runs. However, to bring down risk to almost zero would be "too" prudent and would make it more difficult to keep the economy going. There is thus a trade-off where one wants to bring down risk of bank runs but not by too much.
|
||||
|
John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Future crises are inevitable but they would be less probable and less damaging if post-2008 reforms had gone further
|
||||
|
Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
|
Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
|
Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Financial markets exhibit multiple equilibria driven by expectations. When expectations shift, a new equilibrium emerges, and that could be a crisis equilibrium.
|
||||
