Third degree price discrimination can make consumers on average better off or worse off.
|Alberto Alesina||Harvard||Agree||3||Bio/Vote History|
|Joseph Altonji||Yale||Disagree||3||Bio/Vote History|
|Alan Auerbach||Berkeley||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
|David Autor||MIT||Agree||5||Bio/Vote History|
True in an aggregate way, but distributional implications so not necessarily true for even majority of people.
|Marianne Bertrand||Chicago||Uncertain||3||Bio/Vote History|
|Raj Chetty||Stanford||Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
You can find equilibria where allowing resale makes some worse off. Of course it is interesting why the venue doesn't charge the mkt price.
Without controls, scalpers may buy up all tickets and sell them at high prices. High income people gain, but low income people lose.
|David Cutler||Harvard||Agree||4||Bio/Vote History|
|Angus Deaton||Princeton||Strongly Disagree||7||Bio/Vote History|
Sounds like there are possible gains from trade. Although I'm no expert, I don't see the negative externality caused by opening this market.
|Aaron Edlin||Berkeley||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Barry Eichengreen||Berkeley||Agree||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Ray Fair||Yale||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
Free trade leads to more efficient outcomes in general, but gains from allowing resale would be distributed unequally
It all depends on how the tickets were initially sold. The question is why there was excess demand in the first place.
|Austan Goolsbee||Chicago||Uncertain||2||Bio/Vote History|
|Michael Greenstone||Chicago||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
Of course, the big mystery is the strong tendency to underprice tickets at the box office. Correcting that tendency would be socially good.
|Bengt Holmström||MIT||Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Caroline Hoxby||Stanford||Strongly Agree||10||
Classic example in which good (tickets) are not allocated to those who value them most. Only exception:ticket-holder's identity matters.
|Kenneth Judd||Stanford||Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|Anil Kashyap||Chicago||Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|Pete Klenow||Stanford||Strongly Agree||5||
Yes, though the gains in allocative efficiency could be mitigated by transaction and queuing costs.
-see background information here
|Edward Lazear||Stanford||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Jonathan Levin||Stanford||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Eric Maskin||Harvard||Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|William Nordhaus||Yale||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
|Maurice Obstfeld||Berkeley||Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Emmanuel Saez||Berkeley||Agree||4||Bio/Vote History|
|José Scheinkman||Princeton||No Opinion||Bio/Vote History|
Since no-resale rules may affect price structures, this may not be as simple as it seems.
|Hyun Song Shin||Princeton||Uncertain||7||Bio/Vote History|
|James Stock||Harvard||Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|Nancy Stokey||Chicago||Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|Richard Thaler||Chicago||Strongly Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|Christopher Udry||Yale||Strongly Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
|Luigi Zingales||Chicago||Agree||4||Bio/Vote History|
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