US

Ticket Resale

Laws that limit the resale of tickets for entertainment and sports events make potential audience members for those events worse off on average.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Third degree price discrimination can make consumers on average better off or worse off.
Alesina
Alberto Alesina
Harvard
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
True in an aggregate way, but distributional implications so not necessarily true for even majority of people.
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
You can find equilibria where allowing resale makes some worse off. Of course it is interesting why the venue doesn't charge the mkt price.
Currie
Janet Currie
Princeton
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Without controls, scalpers may buy up all tickets and sell them at high prices. High income people gain, but low income people lose.
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Sounds like there are possible gains from trade. Although I'm no expert, I don't see the negative externality caused by opening this market.
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Free trade leads to more efficient outcomes in general, but gains from allowing resale would be distributed unequally
Goldin
Claudia Goldin
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
It all depends on how the tickets were initially sold. The question is why there was excess demand in the first place.
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Uncertain
2
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Of course, the big mystery is the strong tendency to underprice tickets at the box office. Correcting that tendency would be socially good.
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford
Strongly Agree
10
Bio/Vote History
Classic example in which good (tickets) are not allocated to those who value them most. Only exception:ticket-holder's identity matters.
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Strongly Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Yes, though the gains in allocative efficiency could be mitigated by transaction and queuing costs.
-see background information here
Lazear
Edward Lazear
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Since no-resale rules may affect price structures, this may not be as simple as it seems.
Shin
Hyun Song Shin
Princeton
Uncertain
7
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Stokey
Nancy Stokey
University of Chicago
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Strongly Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Strongly Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Zingales
Luigi Zingales
Chicago Booth
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History