The former head of the Transportation Security Administration is correct in arguing that randomizing airport “security procedures encountered by passengers (additional upper-torso pat-downs, a thorough bag search, a swab test of carry-ons, etc.), while not subjecting everyone to the full gamut" would make it "much harder for terrorists to learn how to evade security procedures."
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Giving TSA officers discretion is a good idea; simply randomizing some procedures does not prevent terrorists learning
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I am not sure that this is an economics question! I can't quantify the speed of terrorist learning....
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 Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Would like to see some evidence. Theory is not clear on rules vs. discretion.
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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"Randomization" is rarely random in practice, often for good reasons. If the search intensity is the same, how is it safer to search fewer?
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Then why not send mutliple terrorists to a flight? A subset would make it randomly through. Profiling is more effective than randomization.
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 Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It would probably make it harder for a terrorist to learn the procedure being used but it would make getting through the system easier.
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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so long as terrorists aren't too nuts to be deterred
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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would full set of potential procedures be public? frequency of testing matters too. would reduce travel hassle but could increase risks
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I don't think economists have any professional expertise in this area. Anti-terrorist policy should be evidence-based, not Aristotelian.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Unconditional randomization is dumb. Randomization CONDITIONAL on a person's characteristics w enormous penalties for dangerous items: yes.
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This won't stop terrorists who are both intelligent and suicidal, as were the 9/11 guys.
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Predictability does seem unwise, but I am uncertain about the most efficient ways to deliver safety.
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too complex an issue to speak to without having researched it more thoroughly. I don't feel that I know the data or arguments.
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Seems consistent with many studies that emphasize random audits as a valuable way to catch or deter bad behavior.
-see background information here -see background information here |
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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While this sounds plausible, I don't feel I know enough to have an opinion.
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 Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This depends on the details. If the methods are secret then using them rarely will make them harder to discern in which case, yes.
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Is there any theory or evidence on this point? Is it an issue about which economists have any special insight?
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Of course mixed strategy is better. Most of what TSA does is just barn door closing or for show. Reinforcing the cockpit door did a lot.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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