Behavior in many complex and seemingly intractable strategic settings can be understood more clearly by working out what each party in the game will choose to do if they realize that the other parties will be solving the same problem. This insight has helped us understand behavior as diverse as military conflicts, price setting by competing firms and penalty kicking in soccer.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Many ambiguous predictions, but broad insights of game theory are relevant to infinite # of domains.
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Individuals are only boundedly rational, as the famous Keynes' Beauty Contest Experiments shows. Nevertheless strategic thinking improves.
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This conclusion is supported by 65 years of research and many significant concrete applications. Of course, any theory is imperfect.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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You know this and you know that I know that you know this.
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Just being aware that others are solving similar problems doesn't lead to the successes economists have had. Rather it is Nash equilibrium.
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nash equilibrium is enormously useful. But people can be less rational than the theory supposes and so the predictions may be misleading.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Thank you, John Nash!
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nash created a whole new way to look at many problems, not always perfect, but a great starting point and benchmark
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But one must be careful not to apply such equilibrium analysis in setting where it is not warranted.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Even a confirmed behavioralist has to admit that this analysis is often informative, if not always definitive.
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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As with much of rational choice theory, Nash equilibrium defines a benchmark to which behavior can be compared. No theory, no anomalies.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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As with any tool, game theory can be misused. But it can provide surprising and useful insights.
-see background information here |
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