Behavior in many complex and seemingly intractable strategic settings can be understood more clearly by working out what each party in the game will choose to do if they realize that the other parties will be solving the same problem. This insight has helped us understand behavior as diverse as military conflicts, price setting by competing firms and penalty kicking in soccer.
|Daron Acemoglu||MIT||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Alberto Alesina||Harvard||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Joseph Altonji||Yale||Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Alan Auerbach||Berkeley||Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|David Autor||MIT||Strongly Agree||8||
Many ambiguous predictions, but broad insights of game theory are relevant to infinite # of domains.
|Katherine Baicker||Harvard||Strongly Agree||4||Bio/Vote History|
|Abhijit Banerjee||MIT||Strongly Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Marianne Bertrand||Chicago||Strongly Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
Individuals are only boundedly rational, as the famous Keynes' Beauty Contest Experiments shows. Nevertheless strategic thinking improves.
|Raj Chetty||Harvard||Strongly Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Judith Chevalier||Yale||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|David Cutler||Harvard||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Angus Deaton||Princeton||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Darrell Duffie||Stanford||Strongly Agree||9||
This conclusion is supported by 65 years of research and many significant concrete applications. Of course, any theory is imperfect.
|Aaron Edlin||Berkeley||Strongly Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Barry Eichengreen||Berkeley||Agree||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Liran Einav||Stanford||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
|Ray Fair||Yale||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Amy Finkelstein||MIT||Strongly Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|Pinelopi Goldberg||Yale||Agree||6||Bio/Vote History|
You know this and you know that I know that you know this.
|Michael Greenstone||Chicago||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
Just being aware that others are solving similar problems doesn't lead to the successes economists have had. Rather it is Nash equilibrium.
|Oliver Hart||Harvard||Strongly Agree||10||
Nash equilibrium is enormously useful. But people can be less rational than the theory supposes and so the predictions may be misleading.
|Bengt Holmström||MIT||Strongly Agree||7||Bio/Vote History|
|Caroline Hoxby||Stanford||Strongly Agree||10||
Thank you, John Nash!
|Hilary Hoynes||Berkeley||Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
|Kenneth Judd||Stanford||Strongly Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
|Steven Kaplan||Chicago||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
Nash created a whole new way to look at many problems, not always perfect, but a great starting point and benchmark
|Pete Klenow||Stanford||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Jonathan Levin||Stanford||Strongly Agree||10||Bio/Vote History|
|Eric Maskin||Harvard||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
|William Nordhaus||Yale||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Emmanuel Saez||Berkeley||Agree||5||Bio/Vote History|
|Larry Samuelson||Yale||Strongly Agree||8||
But one must be careful not to apply such equilibrium analysis in setting where it is not warranted.
|José Scheinkman||Princeton||Did Not Answer||Bio/Vote History|
|Richard Schmalensee||MIT||Strongly Agree||8||
Even a confirmed behavioralist has to admit that this analysis is often informative, if not always definitive.
|Carl Shapiro||Berkeley||Strongly Agree||9||Bio/Vote History|
|Robert Shimer||Chicago||Strongly Agree||8||Bio/Vote History|
As with much of rational choice theory, Nash equilibrium defines a benchmark to which behavior can be compared. No theory, no anomalies.
|Christopher Udry||Yale||Strongly Agree||7||
As with any tool, game theory can be misused. But it can provide surprising and useful insights.
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