Question A:
The way in which money market funds normally trade – at one dollar per share, even though the per-share value of the assets backing them varies over time – made them vulnerable to a run in 2008 before they received taxpayer guarantees.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Taxpayers would be better protected if each money market fund in the U.S. were instead required to trade at its floating net asset value.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
In the absence of floating net asset values, taxpayers would be better protected if each money market fund in the U.S. were required to set aside capital to protect against losses while holding back a portion of shareholders' cash for a time when they seek to withdraw all of their money.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The alternative is committing not to rescue them, which is difficult.
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 Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This would lower the incentive to be the first to run. These runs are destructive.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Better protected means just that -- smaller chance of a run. Doesn't necessarily mean it is socially desirable.
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is one possible remedy for the problem, but not the only one. It also has some features incompatible with the intended use of MMFs.
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Floating NAV definitely ends the risk of a run. Only caveat is what happens to the money that MIGHT migrate. Could be a whack a mole issue
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Money market funds are mutual funds. They should not be allowed to pretend otherwise.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not sure about this policy. Would be very confusing to investors who (wrongly) think of these as bank accounts rather than investments.
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This would lower run risk, analogous to bank capital requirements as a mitigant of depositor runs.
-see background information here |
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Claudia Goldin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This sounds correct but I would need to think about it more to have much certainty about it.
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bigger capital cushions -- relative to the past -- are surely desirable. But the optimal level is unknown.
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This is one possible remedy for the problem, but not the only one. It also has some features incompatible with the intended use of MMFs.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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SEC has a chance to require this and it would help. This probably leads to more migration than floating NAV.
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Edward Lazear |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hyun Song Shin |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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How much capital would be "enough" in case of a run? When would the waiting period be enforeced? This is a weak policy alternative.
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Seems like this could ENCOURAGE runs.
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Zingales |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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