Tuesday, November 11th, 2014 9:25 am

Fast-Track Authority

Question A: By lowering bargaining costs, fast-track negotiating authority for the president makes it more likely that the U.S. can conclude major trade deals.

Responses
 

Source: IGM Economic Experts Panel
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Source: IGM Economic Experts Panel
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

Question B: Past major trade deals have benefited most Americans.

Responses
 

Source: IGM Economic Experts Panel
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Source: IGM Economic Experts Panel
www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Comment Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu Daron Acemoglu MIT Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Alesina Alberto Alesina Harvard Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
         
Altonji Joseph Altonji Yale Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Auerbach Alan Auerbach Berkeley Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Autor David Autor MIT Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Baicker Katherine Baicker Harvard Agree 4
Bio/Vote History
         
Banerjee Abhijit Banerjee MIT Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Bertrand Marianne Bertrand Chicago Agree 1
Bio/Vote History
         
Brunnermeier Markus Brunnermeier Princeton Agree 7
Fast track limits the power of special interest groups.
Bio/Vote History
         
Chetty Raj Chetty Harvard Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
         
Chevalier Judith Chevalier Yale Agree 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Currie Janet Currie Princeton Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Cutler David Cutler Harvard Strongly Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Deaton Angus Deaton Princeton Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Duffie Darrell Duffie Stanford Agree 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Edlin Aaron Edlin Berkeley Agree 9
Bio/Vote History
         
Eichengreen Barry Eichengreen Berkeley Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Einav Liran Einav Stanford Uncertain 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Fair Ray Fair Yale Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Finkelstein Amy Finkelstein MIT Strongly Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Goldberg Pinelopi Goldberg Yale Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Goolsbee Austan Goolsbee Chicago Strongly Agree 10
obvious
Bio/Vote History
         
Greenstone Michael Greenstone Chicago Strongly Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Hall Robert Hall Stanford Uncertain 1
Complicated question outside my expertise
Bio/Vote History
         
Hart Oliver Hart Harvard Agree 7
If one party can make a take-it-or- leave-it offer to another party, a deal is often more likely than if bargaining occurs. But not always.
Bio/Vote History
         
Holmström Bengt Holmström MIT Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Hoxby Caroline Hoxby Stanford Agree 6
If president is pro-trade, the answer is yes. However, giving an anti-trade president greater powers could reduce quality of trade agreemts
Bio/Vote History
         
Hoynes Hilary Hoynes Berkeley Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Judd Kenneth Judd Stanford Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Kaplan Steven Kaplan Chicago Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Kashyap Anil Kashyap Chicago Strongly Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Klenow Pete Klenow Stanford Strongly Agree 5 Bio/Vote History
         
Levin Jonathan Levin Stanford No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
         
Maskin Eric Maskin Harvard Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Nordhaus William Nordhaus Yale Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Saez Emmanuel Saez Berkeley Agree 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Samuelson Larry Samuelson Yale Strongly Agree 10
Without something like fast track, trade deals are notoriously difficult.
Bio/Vote History
         
Scheinkman José Scheinkman Princeton Strongly Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Schmalensee Richard Schmalensee MIT Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Shapiro Carl Shapiro Berkeley Strongly Agree 9
Bio/Vote History
         
Shimer Robert Shimer Chicago Agree 3
Fast track reduces the number of groups that must agree to the trade pact
Bio/Vote History
         
Thaler Richard Thaler Chicago Strongly Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Udry Christopher Udry Yale Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Comment Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu Daron Acemoglu MIT Agree 6
We underestimate the costs of trade through employment (e.g. with low-wage countries in manufacturing), net benefits still likely to be +.
Bio/Vote History
         
Alesina Alberto Alesina Harvard Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
         
Altonji Joseph Altonji Yale Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Auerbach Alan Auerbach Berkeley Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Autor David Autor MIT Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Baicker Katherine Baicker Harvard Agree 2
Bio/Vote History
         
Banerjee Abhijit Banerjee MIT Uncertain 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Bertrand Marianne Bertrand Chicago Uncertain 1
Bio/Vote History
         
Brunnermeier Markus Brunnermeier Princeton Uncertain 4
Trade made certain, especially lower quality, goods cheaper but also transferred some jobs.
Bio/Vote History
         
Chetty Raj Chetty Harvard Did Not Answer
Bio/Vote History
         
Chevalier Judith Chevalier Yale No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
         
Currie Janet Currie Princeton Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Cutler David Cutler Harvard Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Deaton Angus Deaton Princeton Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Duffie Darrell Duffie Stanford Agree 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Edlin Aaron Edlin Berkeley Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Eichengreen Barry Eichengreen Berkeley Agree 4
Bio/Vote History
         
Einav Liran Einav Stanford Agree 3
Bio/Vote History
         
Fair Ray Fair Yale Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Finkelstein Amy Finkelstein MIT Strongly Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Goldberg Pinelopi Goldberg Yale Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Goolsbee Austan Goolsbee Chicago Agree 9
Bio/Vote History
         
Greenstone Michael Greenstone Chicago Agree 4
V likely more Americans have benefited but losses for some are substantial. Social welfare calculations are complicated.
Bio/Vote History
         
Hall Robert Hall Stanford Agree 4
Wrong question-should be world welfare, not US welfare. I view policy as a citizen of the world. Trade is generally beneficial to the world.
Bio/Vote History
         
Hart Oliver Hart Harvard Agree 7
Trade deals typically reduce barriers to trade which is likely to produce net gains to the U.S. ( although there can be winners and losers).
Bio/Vote History
         
Holmström Bengt Holmström MIT Agree 4
Bio/Vote History
         
Hoxby Caroline Hoxby Stanford Strongly Agree 10
Most (though not all) Americans gain b/c consumption & productivity benefits outweigh loss of industry/occupation-specific human capital.
Bio/Vote History
         
Hoynes Hilary Hoynes Berkeley Strongly Agree 9
Bio/Vote History
         
Judd Kenneth Judd Stanford Strongly Agree 8
Employment adjustments may hurt some, but good policy can limit those losses in terms of duration and extent.
Bio/Vote History
         
Kaplan Steven Kaplan Chicago Agree 8
Bio/Vote History
         
Kashyap Anil Kashyap Chicago Strongly Agree 7
Trade deals are about expanding consumption choices not about jobs. Ross Perot's giant sucking sound is a myth
Bio/Vote History
         
Klenow Pete Klenow Stanford Strongly Agree 8 Bio/Vote History
         
Levin Jonathan Levin Stanford Agree 4
Bio/Vote History
         
Maskin Eric Maskin Harvard Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Nordhaus William Nordhaus Yale Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Saez Emmanuel Saez Berkeley Uncertain 4
Bio/Vote History
         
Samuelson Larry Samuelson Yale Agree 8
Unfortunately, benefitting most still leaves ample room for adverse effects for some.
Bio/Vote History
         
Scheinkman José Scheinkman Princeton Agree 8
However we could have done more to compensate the loosers
Bio/Vote History
         
Schmalensee Richard Schmalensee MIT Agree 5
Positive aggregate benefits does not imply that most Americans benefit, but it seems likely in this case.
Bio/Vote History
         
Shapiro Carl Shapiro Berkeley Agree 7
Bio/Vote History
         
Shimer Robert Shimer Chicago Agree 6
Bio/Vote History
         
Thaler Richard Thaler Chicago Agree 5
Bio/Vote History
         
Udry Christopher Udry Yale Strongly Agree 7
The problem is that those who have been hurt have typically not been compensated.
Bio/Vote History
         

10 New Economic Experts join the IGM Panel


For the past two years, our expert panelists have been informing the public about the extent to which economists agree or disagree on important public policy issues. This week, we are delighted to announce that we are expanding the IGM Economic Experts Panel to add ten new distinguished economists. Like our other experts, these new panelists have impeccable qualifications to speak on public policy matters, and their names will be familiar to other economists and the media.

To give the public a broad sense of their views on policy issues, each new expert has responded to a selection of 16 statements that our panel had previously addressed. We chose these 16 statements, which cover a wide range of important policy areas, because the original panelists' responses to them were analyzed in a paper comparing the views of our economic experts with those of the American public. You can find that paper, by Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, here. The paper, along with other analyses of the experts' views, was discussed during the American Economic Association annual meetings, and the video can be found here.

The new panelists' responses to these statements can be seen on their individual voting history pages. Our ten new economic experts are:

Abhijit Banerjee (MIT)
Markus K. Brunnermeier (Princeton)
Liran Einav (Stanford)
Amy Finkelstein (MIT)
Oliver Hart (Harvard)
Hilary Hoynes (Berkeley)
Steven N. Kaplan (Chicago)
Larry Samuelson (Yale)
Carl Shapiro (Berkeley)
Robert Shimer (Chicago)


Please note that, for the 16 previous topics on which these new panelists have voted, we left the charts showing the distribution of responses unchanged. Those charts reflect the responses that our original panelists gave at the time, and we have not altered them to reflect the views of the new experts.

We have also taken this opportunity to ask our original panelists whether they would vote differently on any of the statements we have asked about in the past. Several experts chose to highlight statements to which they would currently respond differently. In such cases, you will see this "revote" below the panelist's original vote. We think you will enjoy seeing examples of statements on which some experts have reconsidered.

As with the 16 previous statements voted on by new panelists, these "revote" responses are not reflected in the chart that we display showing the distribution of views for that topic: all the charts for previous questions reflect the distribution of views that the experts expressed when the statement was originally posed.

About the IGM Economic Experts Panel

This panel explores the extent to which economists agree or disagree on major public policy issues. To assess such beliefs we assembled this panel of expert economists. Statistics teaches that a sample of (say) 40 opinions will be adequate to reflect a broader population if the sample is representative of that population.

To that end, our panel was chosen to include distinguished experts with a keen interest in public policy from the major areas of economics, to be geographically diverse, and to include Democrats, Republicans and Independents as well as older and younger scholars. The panel members are all senior faculty at the most elite research universities in the United States. The panel includes Nobel Laureates, John Bates Clark Medalists, fellows of the Econometric society, past Presidents of both the American Economics Association and American Finance Association, past Democratic and Republican members of the President's Council of Economics, and past and current editors of the leading journals in the profession. This selection process has the advantage of not only providing a set of panelists whose names will be familiar to other economists and the media, but also delivers a group with impeccable qualifications to speak on public policy matters.

Finally, it is important to explain one aspect of our voting process. In some instances a panelist may neither agree nor disagree with a statement, and there can be two very different reasons for this. One case occurs when an economist is an expert on a topic and yet sees the evidence on the exact claim at hand as ambiguous. In such cases our panelists vote "uncertain". A second case relates to statements on topics so far removed from the economist's expertise that he or she feels unqualified to vote. In this case, our panelists vote "no opinion".

The Economic Experts Panel questions are emailed individually to the members of the panel, and each responds electronically at his or her convenience. Panelists may consult whatever resources they like before answering.

Members of the public are free to suggest questions (see link below), and the panelists suggest many themselves. Members of the IGM faculty are responsible for deciding the final version of each week’s question. We usually send a draft of the question to the panel in advance, and invite them to point out problems with the wording if they see any. In response, we typically receive a handful of suggested clarifications from individual experts. This process helps us to spot inconsistencies, and to reduce vagueness or problems of interpretation.

The panel data are copyrighted by the Initiative on Global Markets and are being analyzed for an article to appear in a leading peer-reviewed journal.

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