Factors Contributing to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis

Please rate the importance (0=none; 5= highest) of each item below (presented to panelists in randomized order) in contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis.

The following items were presented to panelists in randomized order.

1. Inadequate or flawed regulation, supervision, or both with respect to the financial sector (which includes financial infrastructure, banks, shadow banks, and interconnections in the system)
2. Underestimation of the riskiness of securities created with financial engineering
3. Bad incentives, fraud, or both in mortgage issuance and securitization
4. Funding runs involving short-term liabilities financing long-term assets
5. Failures by rating agencies
6. Inflated beliefs about housing prices
7. Elevated levels of US household debt as of 2007
8. A belief by bankers that their institutions were Too Big to Fail
9. Government involvement in subsidizing mortgages, homeownership, or both
10. Imbalances between global savings and well-functioning channels for investing those savings
11. Loose monetary policy by the Fed, by central banks around the world, or both
12. Fair value or mark-to-market accounting for financial assets held by banks

Below are the individual responses for the European Panel.
Click here to see the individual responses for the US Panel.

Participant	University	Vote	Confidence	Comment Bio/Vote History
Philippe Aghion	Harvard	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Franklin Allen	Imperial College London	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 5 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	8	The causes of the financial crisis are numerous. Much more work needs to be done to understand the relative importance of each. Bio/Vote History
Pol Antras	Harvard	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	7	Bio/Vote History
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré	Paris School of Economics	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning No Opinion J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	7	Bio/Vote History
Timothy J. Besley	LSE	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Olivier Blanchard	Peterson Institute	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	9	The list is a good one. Nearly all the factors combined to shape the crisis. Bio/Vote History
Nicholas Bloom	Stanford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 1 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 1 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 0 E. Rating Agency Failures 1 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 0 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 0 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	7	This list seems rather unbalanced towards the banking sector and away from the real side of the economy. House prices went too high, and then collapsed and the economy followed. I think amplifying this I would also add uncertainty – my pet peeve. Bio/Vote History
Richard William Blundell	University College London	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Elena Carletti	Bocconi	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 5 K. Loose Monetary Policy 5 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	10	Difficult to rate these items, in particular in isolation. Many are interrelated in that they are relevant in conjunction with others. Bio/Vote History
Jean-Pierre Danthine	Paris School of Economics	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Bio/Vote History
Paul De Grauwe	LSE	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	5	Bio/Vote History
Jan Eeckhout	University College London	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 1 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	6	Bio/Vote History
Ernst Fehr	Universität Zurich	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	7	TBTF is tricky. Banks had far too little equity for –‘ve shocks, prob b/c they underestimated shock risks. TBTF beliefs could have driven this. But top mgrs likely to lose jobs if rescued, so hard to believe they gambled BECAUSE they expected rescue. Bio/Vote History
Xavier Freixas	Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln	Goethe-Universität Frankfurt	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	5	Bio/Vote History
Jordi Galí	Universitat Pompeu Fabra	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	7	Bio/Vote History
Luis Garicano	LSE	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	6	The interplay between ever rising house prices (with extrapolative expectations on future increases), a broken Financial Engineering technology leading to excessive credit access and ridiculously lax capital requirements for banks led to build up and bust. Bio/Vote History
Francesco Giavazzi	Bocconi	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Rachel Griffith	University of Manchester	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1 G. Household Debt Levels No Opinion H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning No Opinion J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	1	Bio/Vote History
Veronica Guerrieri	Chicago Booth	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 1 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 5 K. Loose Monetary Policy 0 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	9	Bio/Vote History
Luigi Guiso	Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 2 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 1 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4 K. Loose Monetary Policy 4 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	7	Bio/Vote History
Martin Hellwig	Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	9	This was tremendous market failure, facilitated by bad regulation and weak supervision. TBTF was less important because they never thought of failing. Global interconnectedness, direct or through market prices, should als be high on the list. -see background information here and here. Bio/Vote History
Patrick Honohan	Trinity College Dublin	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	8	Reckless risk taking by bankers reflected hubris, distorted incentives, over-confidence in risk management techniques and disaster myopia. Regulators were complacent, Easy money and savings glut were merely the macro background context. Bio/Vote History
Henrik Kleven	Princeton	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Botond K?szegi	Central European University	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels No Opinion H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy No Opinion L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	Bio/Vote History
Jan Pieter Krahnen	Goethe University Frankfurt	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 1 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	9	Ultimately, the 2008 GFC was about systemic risk, which forced governments to intervene and to reject bank resolution. Bio/Vote History
Per Krusell	Stockholm University	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 1 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	7	Regulating financial markets is in principle important but very difficult. One, it is hard to figure out what “frictions” to focus on (some of which are government-induced). Two, financial institutions will adapt to avoid any restrictions… Bio/Vote History
Eliana La Ferrara	Bocconi	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Christian Leuz	Chicago Booth	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 2 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 5 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	7	Contains causes & amplifiers. Gave lower scores to boosters. H’hold debt&bank leverage are endogenous. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) were key mechanism not cause. Flawed incentives, weak supervision & unsophisticated players fueled bubble & weakened mkt’s corrective forces. -see background information here Bio/Vote History
Costas Meghir	Yale	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Peter Neary	Oxford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning No Opinion J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	5	Sophisticated financial instruments can improve the efficiency of financial markets and need not be destabilizing. But regulators should ensure that their ultimate asset base is transparent and that holders have adequate margins. Bio/Vote History
Kevin O’Rourke	Oxford	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Marco Pagano	Università di Napoli Federico II	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 5 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	4	Several of the above items are different facets of the same phenomenon, rather than alternative factors. E.g. bad incentives in mortgage issuance and Financial Engineering & failures by Rating Agency Failures; or TBTF & flawed Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision. Bio/Vote History
Lubos Pastor	Chicago Booth	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 4 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Bio/Vote History
Torsten Persson	Stockholm University	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Christopher Pissarides	LSE	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History
Richard Portes	London Business School	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 4 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 1 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 0 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 5 K. Loose Monetary Policy 0 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	9	Add: excessive leverage throughout system (not just households); withholding LOLR support from Lehman. Both get 4. Bio/Vote History
Canice Prendergast	Chicago Booth	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision No Opinion B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) No Opinion C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) No Opinion E. Rating Agency Failures No Opinion F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning No Opinion J. Savings and Investment Imbalances No Opinion K. Loose Monetary Policy No Opinion L. Fair-Value Accounting No Opinion	3	Bio/Vote History
Lucrezia Reichlin	London Business School	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 1 G. Household Debt Levels 5 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 0 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Bio/Vote History
Rafael Repullo	CEMFI	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 1 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 1 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 4 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Bio/Vote History
Hélène Rey	London Business School	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 5 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 5 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 1	8	Many factors contributed to the 2008 global financial crisis. But at the heart of the mechanism was a dysfunctional financial sector with misallocation of capital, bad incentives, insufficient supervision and some fraudulent behaviour. Bio/Vote History
Antoinette Schoar	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 3 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 3 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 5 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 2	7	Bio/Vote History
John Van Reenen	MIT	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 4 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 0 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 1 L. Fair-Value Accounting 3	7	Financial regulation was the major problem . Reforms have helped stabilize & it’s important that US does not roll them back (see Yellen’s 2017 speech in Jackson Hole) -see background information here Bio/Vote History
John Vickers	Oxford	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 4 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 3 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 2 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	8	Leverage was grossly excessive, making the system too fragile to withstand the shock of the subprime crisis and its effects on property prices and associated derivatives. Bio/Vote History
Hans-Joachim Voth	University of Zurich	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 5 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 5 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 5 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 4 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 3 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 3 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	7	Bio/Vote History
Beatrice Weder di Mauro	Gutenberg University Mainz and INSEAD	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 4 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 4 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 3 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 1 K. Loose Monetary Policy 3 L. Fair-Value Accounting 4	9	Bio/Vote History
Karl Whelan	University College Dublin	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 2 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 2 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 2 E. Rating Agency Failures 3 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 2 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 2 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 2 K. Loose Monetary Policy 2 L. Fair-Value Accounting	7	Ultimately, the global financial crisis reflected poor regulation and supervision of the banking sector. The other items listed are just factors that regulators should have been taking into account or paying better attention to. Bio/Vote History
Charles Wyplosz	The Graduate Institute Geneva	A. Flawed Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision 5 B. Underestimated Risks (Financial Engineering) 3 C. Mortgages: Fraud and Bad Incentives 3 D. Funding Runs (ST Liabilities) 5 E. Rating Agency Failures 4 F. Housing-Price Beliefs 2 G. Household Debt Levels 3 H. Too-Big-To-Fail Beliefs 4 I. Government Subsidies: Mortgages, Home Owning 1 J. Savings and Investment Imbalances 0 K. Loose Monetary Policy 0 L. Fair-Value Accounting 0	7	Proper regulation and supervision would have prevented the crisis. Bio/Vote History
Fabrizio Zilibotti	Universität Zurich	Did Not Answer		Bio/Vote History