Legislation introduced in Congress would require the Federal Reserve to "submit to the appropriate congressional committees…a Directive Policy Rule", which shall "describe the strategy or rule of the Federal Open Market Committee for the systematic quantitative adjustment of the Policy Instrument Target to respond to a change in the Intermediate Policy Inputs." Should the Fed deviate from the rule, the Fed Chair would have to "testify before the appropriate congressional committees as to why the [rule]…is not in compliance." Enacting this provision would improve monetary policy outcomes in the U.S.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Given the increasingly important and discretionary role the Fed plays, supervision is essential. Congress may not be the right body to do it
|
||||
 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Preserving the Fed's autonomy is valuable. Imagine if Congress had been running the Fed during the Financial Crisis --- certain disaster!
|
||||
 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Rules are very useful, but one has to be careful not undermine central bank's independence, which untie central banks from political cycle.
|
||||
 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The Fed's track record in economic policy-making, while imperfect, is vastly superior to that of Congress.
|
||||
 Janet Currie |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Such a policy would undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve.
|
||||
 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
A quantitative formula is not flexible in the face of structural changes, and reduces Fed independence too much. Clear goals are enough.
|
||||
 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Monetary policy should be based on a target for inflation and unemployment (such as difference between the two) not on an instrument rule
-see background information here |
||||
 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
No rules would have allowed the Fed to act appropriately in the recent crisis. Better to choose governors well and give them discretion.
|
||||
 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Would not have stopped Nixon-Burns inflation. Greenspan had infinite ability to obfuscate. Do we want Congress defining deviations?
|
||||
 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Data revisions alone cast doubt on this. Instead let's raise the qualifications and pay of who we appoint. Read this bill, very quirky.
-see background information here |
||||
 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Too narrow and likely to compromise Fed independence. Something like Norway's Central Bank reports (see p.18-19) could be more useful.
-see background information here |
||||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Such legislation seems likely to compromise the Fed's political independence.
|
||||
 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Has tendency to politicize monetary policy and to promote inflexibility.
|
||||
 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The essence of the Fed is to be independent. Congressional meddling is not a set forward.
|
||||
 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
|
||||
 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Not a hard call.
|
||||
 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
The Fed has served Americans very well over many decades; meddling by politicians would worsen the performance of the Fed and the economy.
|
||||
 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
Under current Fed leadership, the statement is likely to be false. Under future leadership, accountability might be justifiable.
|
||||
 Nancy Stokey |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
A central bank should be independent. Look at Argentina as an example of where political oversight leads.
|
||||
 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
|
I can't think of any agency in government that would work better with greater supervision from Congress
|
||||
 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
|
|
||||
