In 10 years, per capita purchasing power in Greece will be higher if — rather than continuing to service its debts over the next decade and complying with the budget rules currently in place — it refuses to accept a continuation of its current troika program and explicitly defaults on its debt held by the official sector.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Greece's problems are political not just macroeconomic. Unclear whether default will help. Syriza's approach so far goes in wrong direction
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 Alberto Alesina |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The debt overhang is very costly. Domestic demand is also a problem. And the government is busy fire-fighting rather than making policy.
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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One has to find the right/sustainable balance btw structural reforms that ultimately benefit the common man and some creative debt relief .
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Very hard to know.
-see background information here |
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Impossible to predict all the consequences and their effect on Greece.
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's a tough tradeoff. A fresh start would help after some forced restructuring of labor markets, the civil service, and tax collection.
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Depends mainly on ancillary policies under the two scenarios which are now not possible to foresee.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too many possible effects to know the net effect.
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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They're in a hopeless situation now. But would they manage themselves better if they got out of the Euro than they did before they got in?
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Greece seems incapable of running a big enough primary surplus to satisfy Germany, and it is probably harmful to try. Autarky is better.
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For Greece: default is a plus,exclusion from the EU banking system is a minus- it could lead to bank runs and political chaos. Net unclear.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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They will never repay all that is promised anyway & at some point the pain of avoiding default is too much. Exit will be awful in the SR.
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Greek government debt held by non-Greeks (mostly the EU) is more than Greece's annual GDP.
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 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It all depends on how financial markets react---and this is hard to predict
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Too much uncertainty about response, whether leaves Eurozone, and impacts to have clear reading.
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Greek economic institutions are notoriously ineffective; the troika program may provide the commitment needed to build working institutions.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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So much would seem to depend on the difficult-to-predict reactions of various strategic players with diverse interests and agendas.
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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If Greece continues to service its debt, outcomes are reasonably forecastable. If it defaults, many different outcomes can happen.
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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